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A B S T R A C T
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate about EITI’s effectiveness and future. In particu-
lar, it assesses EITI’s track record in sub-Saharan Africa, and analyses whether and how the 
multi-stakeholder initiative can remain relevant, particularly in this post-Arab Spring era. The 
relevance of these questions derives from two main findings: 1) that all across Africa, citizens 
and civil society groups are becoming more vocal, and are forcing gradual change in the debate 
on and actual management of their natural resources; but 2) that as the Arab uprisings and 
anti-corruption movement show, these changes and debates are, for the most part, taking 
place outside the EITI platform. These findings emanate from desktop research and field visits 
undertaken between January 2008 and January 2013.
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The issue of oil-led development has wider implications for sub-Saharan Africa. Since the mid-1990s, several economies from the region have ex-
perienced high growth rates thanks largely but 
not solely to their natural resources, and in 
particular, oil. As participants at a recent meet-
ing on Africa’s economic growth remarked,1 
the resources boom experienced in the sub-
continent has sustained and/or increased gov-
ernments’ tax receipts and revenues, attracted 
investment in the sector and the region, and to 
some extent, cushioned the effect of the global 
financial crisis in the region. Furthermore, the 
resources boom has done something funda-
mental; it has challenged the perception that 
African countries, especially resource-rich 
ones, cannot grow substantially or are likely 
to grow slower than their resource-poor peers 
over a period of time. 
The “resources story”2 as most enthusias-
tic commentators and investors see it, has a 
flipside, and this is that human development 
has been slow to catch up. In fact, the most 
recent United Nation’s Human Development 
Index shows that in 2011, sub-Saharan Africa 
continued to have the lowest aggregate level 
of human development indicators.3 Take the 
case of Nigeria, sub-Saharan Africa’s largest 
oil exporter. Ranked 156 out of 187 countries 
1 The meeting, “Africa Africa’s Economic Growth: Transi-
tory or Transformative?”, was held at Chatham House, 
London, United Kingdom, on April 20, 2012. See the meet-
ing summary online, at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
default/files/public/Research/Africa/200412summary.pdf
2 R. Khan, Regional Head of Research, Standard Char-
tered, speaking at the aforementioned conference.
3 African Economic Outlook 2012, http://www.africaneco-
nomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/human_development/
in the index, it has an average life expectancy 
at birth of less than 52, and up to 60 percent 
of its population - almost 100 million people 
- are living in poverty.4 According to analysts, 
these conditions represent the most fitting il-
lustration of the phenomenon known as the 
“resource curse”5 or the “paradox of plenty”6 
caused in part by political and economic gov-
ernance deficits.
EITI was created more than ten years ago 
as a response to this complex issue and as a 
policy tool that could stimulate or encourage 
the effective management of natural resource 
revenues for pro-poor development. In es-
sence, it is an international standard-setting 
multi-stakeholder initiative comprising govern-
ments, companies, investors, civil society and 
international organizations. Its main thrust is 
that by strengthening transparency of natural 
resources, this “can reduce corruption, and 
that the revenues from extractive industries 
can transform economies, reduce poverty and 
raise the living standards of entire populations 
in resource-rich  countries”7. However, has it 
achieved its much touted developmental out-
comes? If not, where does its future lie?
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate 
about EITI’s impact and future.8 In particular, 
it assesses the EITI’s track record in sub-Sa-
haran Africa, and analyses whether and how 
the multi-stakeholder initiative can remain 
relevant, particularly in this post-Arab Spring 
era. The relevance of these questions derives 
from two main findings: 1) that all across Africa, 
citizens and civil society groups are becoming 
more vocal, and are forcing gradual change in 
the debate on and actual management of their 
4 African Economic Outlook, “Nigeria,” 2012, http://www.
africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Nige-
ria%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf
5 R. Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Econo-
mies: The Resource Curse Thesis. London: Routledge, 
1993.
6 T.L. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-
States, 1997, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
7 EITI Article of Association, Article 2.2.
8 The paper is part of a doctoral study on oil governance 
in Angola that received funding from Coventry University 
and the Funds for Women Graduates (FfWG).
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natural resources; but 2) that as the Arab up-
risings and the anti-corruption movement - the 
two latest cases in point - show, these changes 
and debates are for the most part, taking place 
outside the EITI platform.9
The article considers whether, and to what 
extent African civil society organizations and 
citizens groups have built on the initiative to 
demand more transparency and accountabil-
ity from their governments, as well as extrac-
tive industries (EI) corporations operating in 
the sub-continent. It also looks at the innova-
tive methods through which these groups are 
showcasing their self-agency, using among oth-
ers, the unexpected case study of Angola. The 
final section of the article reflects on these and 
proposes a way forward.
EITI - The What and How  
EITI is a voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative 
(MSI), contingent upon governments meeting 
five sign-up requirements in order to gain “can-
didate” status: 1) committing to implement 
EITI; 2) committing to work with civil society 
and the private sector; 3) appointing an indi-
vidual to lead on the implementation of EITI; 
4) since 2011, establishing a multi-stakeholder 
group (MSG) with representatives from gov-
ernments, companies and civil society, which 
should oversee the implementation of EITI; 
and 5) in connivance with other stakeholders, 
producing a fully-costed work plan containing 
measurable targets and a timetable for imple-
mentation, and incorporating an assessment of 
capacity constraints.10
Once countries earn their “candidate” sta-
tus, they should go through the following 
process. First, governments should require EI 
companies - private or state-owned - to make 
public all material revenues paid to them, in-
9 These findings are drawn from desktop research on, 
and field visits in, Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of 
Congo and Nigeria between January 2008 and January 
2013. As such, the reader should be mindful of the fact 
that the author speaks entirely from her experience of 
these countries, and recognizes that these findings may 
be different in other contexts.
10 http://eiti.org/eiti/implementation/signup
cluding in-kind payments, infrastructure pro-
visions and barter-type arrangements made 
to or with the host country government. They 
must then record these payments and entrust 
an independent and credible administrator to 
reconcile the figures disclosed by both govern-
ment and companies applying international 
auditing standards, albeit not defined; publish 
the reconciliation report and opinions on any 
discrepancies that may have occurred and as 
of July 1, 2011, do so within 18 months. Finally, 
once the MSG has evaluated the information 
provided, an external organization/individual 
or “validator” is tasked to verify or “validate” 
the reports and produce a validation report.11
Under EITI Rules, 2011 edition, validation 
should be completed within two and a half 
years from the date of the country’s admission 
as a candidate country. The governance of this 
process is overseen by an international board 
comprising an independent chair, an interna-
tional secretariat and five representatives from 
each stakeholder group, namely, implement-
ing countries, civil society organizations, and 
industry and investment companies. Its imple-
mentation is funded through a country’s gov-
ernment, a World Bank-managed Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund, or by multilateral and bilateral do-
nor agencies.  
EITI has gained high international visibility 
and consolidated its status as a global standard-
setting initiative, due in part to the high-level 
endorsement received from investors, the G8 
and G20 member states and major donors such 
as the World Bank. More importantly perhaps, 
11 On the entire process, see EITI Rules, 2011 Edition, 
EITI International Secretariat, Oslo: Norway, http://eiti.org/
files/EITI_Rules_Validations_April2011_1.pdf
All across Africa, citizens and civil  
society groups are becoming more 
vocal, and are forcing gradual change 
but as the Arab anti-corruption move-
ment show, these changes are taking 
place outiside the EITI platform
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is its acceptance among producing states. As of 
January 25, 2013, EITI had 70 oil, gas and min-
ing participating companies, among which 24 
are oil companies; and 37 member countries, 
of which 18 are compliant countries and 19 
candidate countries. 
Assessing the Effectiveness and 
Future of EITI: A Few Notes 
This paper argues that EITI has not brought 
the societal transformation that was arguably 
its much touted objective. To be sure, this is 
not a new finding. The same point was made 
in a 2011 evaluation,12 and in subsequent blogs 
posted on the International Secretariat’s web-
site.13 One of the factors that pushes this is-
sue right to the forefront of discussions on 
resource governance now, and actually de-
mands more attention than it seems to be re-
ceiving, is the current revolutionary wave that 
has been sweeping across the Middle East and 
sub-Sahran Africa. Whilst not romanticizing 
this popular movement, there is no doubt in-
12 Scanteam, Achievements and Strategic Options: 
Evaluation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive, Final Report, May 2011, http://eiti.org/files/2011-EITI-
evaluation-report.pdf
13 See Jean C. Katende, “The New Challenge for EITI: 
Becoming a Tool for Improving the Living Conditions of 
Poor Populations,” Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, 25 January 2013, http://eiti.org/blog/new-
challenge-eiti-becoming-tool-improving-living-conditions-
poor-populations;  D. O’Sullivan, “EITI Needs to Become 
More Ambitious and More Realistic,” 27 September 2012, 
http://eiti.org/blog/eiti-needs-become-more-ambitious-
and-more-realistic; K. Lay, “Making Transparency Work for 
Development,” 9 January 2013, http://eiti.org/blog/making-
transparency-work-development-nigeria
deed that it has wider implications for current 
governance approaches promoted by initia-
tives such as EITI. In particular, the fact that 
the most dramatic changes happened in coun-
tries like Libya and Egypt - non-EITI member 
states, whose repressive governments were 
somewhat accommodated -, increases the im-
portance of the question about the relevance 
and future of the MSI.
In their - largely state-centric - analysis of 
the challenges of measuring the effectiveness 
of transparency, Gillies and Heuty of Revenue 
Watch Institute (RWI) argue that “EITI coun-
tries cannot be compared with those pro-
ducers that stay out.”14 This paper disagrees 
fundamentally with that argument. Taking a 
people-centered approach, it argues instead 
that it is precisely because of the reasons 
and events cited above, and because of the 
increasing political instability experienced in 
places like Mali and Nigeria, both EITI imple-
menting countries, that EITI’s standard setters 
need to start thinking outside the EITI box, in 
order to build on the progress made in the so-
cial arena by others, more so, by some of its 
intended beneficiaries. 
One point Gillies and Heuty rightly make, 
and one the reader should be mindful of 
though, is that transparency tends to be 
tracked alongside other governance reforms 
and as such, it is difficult to attribute gains 
made solely to transparency initiatives.15 
They explain that although transparency can 
alter the incentives of key powerful actors 
through internal and external dynamics de-
picted in Figure I, whether, and the extent to 
which transparency actually leads to policy 
improvements, would depend on a host of 
variables which may not exist, particularly in 
difficult contexts.16 In this regard, and in the 
contexts specified below, members of civil 
society groups interviewed view EITI as the 
14 A. Gillies and A. Heuty, “Does Transparency Work? 
The Challenges of Measurement and Effectiveness in 
Resource-Rich Countries,” Yale Journal of International 
Affairs, Spring/Summer 2011, http://yalejournal.org/wpcon-
tent/uploads/2011/09/4.Articles_GilliesHeuty.pdf
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
Transparency tends to be 
tracked alongside other gover-
nance reforms and as such, it is 
difficult to attribute gains made 
solely to transparency initiatives
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trigger for national debates about the use of 
natural resources for pro-poor development 
and broader reforms. To reflect these percep-
tions, the paper therefore treats the changes 
mentioned here as a consequence, albeit 
indirect, of EITI and/or the public discourse 
about its benefits.
Assessing EITI’s Track Record: 
Positive Outcomes Raising Hope
One of the greatest successes of EITI is that 
through its multi-stakeholder approach, it has 
enabled governments, companies, and civil so-
ciety - that would not otherwise be sitting or 
Source: Gillies and Heuty, 2011.
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Figure 1 The impacts of transparency on the political economy of decision-making  
in resource-rich countries.
LEVEL I 
EFFECTS
Other political and 
economic variables, 
e.g. political com-
petition, benefits of 
corruption/patron-
age, democratic  
accountability,  
legacy and reputa-
tion concerns, etc.
Transparency
Reduction in informational  
asymmetries
Decisions / behaviors
Other variables, e.g. 
macroeconomic 
factors, socio-political 
conditions, demography, 
capacity of state 
institutions, etc.
LEVEL II  
EFFECTS
Increases cost 
of bad decisions/ 
behaviors for 
individuals in power
Greater external 
pressure for good 
decisions/ 
behaviors
Broader outcomes: 
development, poverty 
reduction, democrati-
zation, good  
governance
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want to sit around the same table - to debate 
on matters of public interest.  Although this ap-
proach offers the promise of benefits for each 
of the abovementioned stakeholder groups, 
EITI’s “win-win” model presents governments 
and citizens of resource-rich countries as its 
primary beneficiaries. 
There is, in effect, enough evidence to 
suggest that African citizens have benefited 
greatly from the initiative, notably through civil 
society’s participation in the EITI process and 
the embrace of the oil revenue transparency 
agenda in general. For example, citizens have 
benefited from the increased availability in the 
public domain of EI data, which was previously 
considered to be a matter of national security 
in some contexts. However, it is clear that this 
information would not be meaningful without 
the support of African civil society. Indeed, 
ever since the inception of the debate and im-
plementation of EITI in Cameroon and Congo-
Brazzaville, organizations such as RELUFA and 
RPDH have been monitoring and evaluating 
EITI reports; disseminating information about 
these as well as general information about 
natural resources  -  mostly through posters,17 
drama, roadshows -; and organizing awareness 
campaigns in order to mobilize the public to de-
mand accountability. The African media is also 
increasingly showing a keen interest in issues 
related to extractive industries, even though 
coverage of such matters tends to be irregular, 
sometimes biased, and the jargon used often 
too technical for the “man on the street.”18
These activities have contributed to create 
more awareness around extractive industries 
and strengthen the voice of civil society. They 
17 RELUFA’s poster on how much Cameroon gains from 
its natural resources can be found at http://www.relufa.
org/partners/jhnewsletter/documents/BDRELUFAA4ANGLAIS-
LIGHT.pdf
18 J. C. Canonge, M. Purcell and M. Behrman, Watch-
dog or Lapdog: Limits of African Media Coverage of the 
Extractive Sector, School of International and Public 
Affairs, Columbia University, 2010, http://ke.kcsis.org/
watchdog-or-lapdog-limits-of-african-media-coverage-
of-the-extractive-sector-report/  See also Jaff Bamendjo, 
“Triggering the Local Media in Covering Oil and Mining 
Issues in Cameroon,” RELUFA Newsletter, Fourteenth 
Edition, September 2010, http://www.relufa.org/partners/
jhnewsletter/archives/cameroon14.htm
have also enhanced civil society’s legitimacy 
among the populace and its reputation vis-à-vis 
its EITI “partners” - especially in places like Ghana 
where decisions at the national steering commit-
tee are reached by consensus and not by voting;19 
or in Chad where they are elected following sev-
eral consultative meetings of the CSOs20.
EITI: A Platform for Broader 
Reforms?
EITI promoters claim that EITI can serve as a 
platform for broader governance reforms. In-
terestingly, some African civil society activists 
agree. A Congolese activist noted for instance, 
that:
“… This democratization of information on 
income is leading to more accountability from 
the government vis-à-vis citizens. It is true that 
accountability is not yet radical, in the sense 
that the government has put in place some 
mechanisms to show that it governs in an ef-
fective manner (…). However, there is still a way 
to go, because these structures do not yet have 
the independence and efficiency needed to es-
tablish effective accountability (...) All things 
considered, the critical mass of data available 
in the public domain in Congo, through initia-
tives such as EITI, should allow elected offi-
cials to demand accountability. Moreover, the 
freedom of speech of citizens, who no longer 
hesitate to speak publicly, reminds us of the ap-
propriation of this topic by a great number.”21
There is also a sense that the effect of EITI 
goes beyond EITI implementing countries. This 
is certainly the view of a number of Angolan 
and international activists, who believe that 
19 The IDL Group and Synergie, “Validation of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Ghana,” 
Final Report, http://eiti.org/files/Ghana_Validation_Re-
ports_ENG_0.pdf
20 Misereor, Global Policy Forum Europe and Brot für 
die Welt, “Transparency: An Initial Step Toward Justice” An 
Interim Balance of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) in the Central African Region, 2011, http://
www.cidse.org/content/publications/business-a-human-rights/
country-by-country-reporting/transparency_initial_step_to-
wards_resource_justice.html
21 Communication with the author, August 31, 2012; 
author’s translation.
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the debate on the potential benefits of joining 
the EITI for Angola, and the international trans-
parency campaign in general, is in part behind 
the increase of transparency in public financial 
management in the country.22
Challenges… But the Tide  
is Turning
As expected, EITI’s stakeholders have had differ-
ent expectations of the MSI, and often divergent 
- normative and material - interests influenced 
by their own “sector-specific rationales.”23 Un-
fortunately, these self-interest motives turned 
out to be much stronger than the common goal 
pursued through the EITI process, and subse-
quently led to detrimental unintended conse-
quences. Oft-cited challenges of EITI include civil 
society’s reliance on governments’ publication 
of information and/or funding,24 and these gov-
ernments’ attempts to use EITI as a tool for re-
configuring “the constellation of social forces in 
the very communities which they initially seek 
to represent and include.”25
Incidentally, therefore, at the same time 
that it appears to be reinforcing power asym-
metries that analysts say lead to rent-seeking 
and other patterns identified in the “resource 
curse” literature, EITI is seen to improve the 
international relations of many implementing 
states, even those that merely pay lip service 
to it. As a direct result of their implementing 
EITI, these countries are able to gain access to 
international finance - in the form of foreign 
22 Author’s interviews with several Angolan and inter-
national NGO officials, and analysts.
23 A. Peters, T. Forster and L. Koechlin, “Towards 
Non-State Actors as Effective, Legitimate, and Account-
able Standard Setters” in Anne Peters, Till Forster, Lucy 
Koechlin and Fenner Zinkernagel (eds.) Non-State Actors 
as Standards Setters, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009.
24 See, for example, S.A. Aaronson and J. Brinkerhoff, 
“Limited Partnership: Business, Government, Civil Society 
(NGOs) and the Public in the Extractive Industry Transpar-
ency Initiative (EITI),” George Washington University, Oc-
tober 2009, http://elliott.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/
Aaronson_IIEPWP2010-28.pdf
25 S. Bracking, “Hiding Conflict Over Industry Returns: A 
Stakeholder Analysis of the Extractive Industries Transpar-
ency Initiative” BWPI Working Paper 91, 2009.
aid or direct investment, tax income and lower 
borrowing costs or debt relief - and shore up 
their and their leaders’ international reputa-
tion. The same is true of EI companies, con-
sumer states and international donors whose 
reputation have equally been protected and 
even enhanced, despite the fact that their sup-
port for the MSI has often been ambiguous 
and/or inconsistent.  
The abovementioned dynamics gave rise 
to a sense that “none of these key players has 
had an overriding interest in changing the way 
things are”26 and a sense that EITI is still an elit-
ist agenda, detached from citizens. The “civil 
society” that participates in the EITI process 
includes mostly organizations linked to the 
Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Coalition, almost 
all of which are located in capitals or big cities, 
while actors with critical voices and a greater 
understanding of issues that matter to citizens, 
including trade unions and grassroots organi-
zations, are excluded and pushed to find new 
avenues to express themselves and put across 
their grievances.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the “second 
degree” of the international campaign to build 
transparency and accountability in the EI - that 
focuses on “publish where you spend and how 
you spent the money”27 - in the sub-region has 
come from this latter set of actors. One notes 
26 Interviews with former EITI Board member, 26 April 
2010, and NGO Official, 18, August 2010. See also M. Abu-
tudu and G. Dauda, “Natural Resource Governance and 
EITI Implementation in Nigeria,” Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 
Uppsala 2011.
27 Words of an Angolan NGO official interviewed on 
August 4, 2010.
It is young people who are  
leading anti-government and 
anti-corruption protests across 
Africa. And their voices are  
definitely not to be undermined
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the work done by Dynamique Citoyenne and 
CANADEL, two Cameroonian NGOs and non-
members of PWYP, on budget transparency28; 
and the activism of oil and gas workers from 
Nigeria, in trying to keep oil companies honest 
about production quotas.29 In fact, across the 
sub-continent, through art, music and street 
demonstrations, young people along with oth-
er social groups, have taken it upon themselves 
to ask difficult questions about the use of pub-
lic resources and the levels of unemployment 
while politicians “fill the streets with Prados”30. 
This citizen-led activism is witnessed else-
where in Africa, including in some of the un-
expected places like Egypt, Libya and Angola, 
whose case is as insightful as the two previous 
ones. Once considered a poster child of the 
resource curse and a “state without citizens”31 
- because of the effect of tight presidential 
control on the political system and the exer-
cise of citizenship rights -, Angola has indeed 
been “changing with the times”32, in the most 
dramatic way. Reputational concerns, eco-
nomic interests and the need to gain legitimacy 
28 D. Halleson, Amplifying Citizens’ Voices: The Role of 
Civil Society in Promoting Accountability and Transpar-
ency in Cameroon’s Contract Regime’, in A New Role for 
Citizens in Public Procurement, a Transparencia Mexicana 
Initiative, 2012.
29 See Abutudu and Dauda, above n26.
30 Retrieved from Lettre au President, a song by the 
Cameroonian Rapper nicknamed “Valsero”.
31 All Party Parliamentary Group on Angola, Observa-
tions and Recommendations on a Visit to Angola, Septem-
ber 2006, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/
public/Research/Africa/appgangola0906.pdf
32 A. Vines, “Angola Changing with the Times,” IPRIS 
Lusophone Countries Bulletin, April 2010.
among its people led the Angolan government 
to provide some degree of transparency into 
its earnings from the oil sector, and gradually 
allow for the political opening up and participa-
tion of civil society. However, these improve-
ments did very little to fill the big gap between 
the poor section of society which makes up the 
majority of the Angolan population; and the 
rich one, made up of a small number of political 
and economic elites that have ruled the coun-
try ever since its independence in 1975. If any-
thing, by increasing public scrutiny, they threw 
open more windows for Angolans to be will-
ing to, and actively take part in, the process of 
change in their country. The resulting outcome 
was the mushrooming of individual and youth-
led initiatives which, it should be said, was fa-
cilitated among other factors, by the spread of 
information communication technologies and 
lately, influenced by the Arab uprisings. 
One such initiative that is gaining promi-
nence is Maka Angola, an online-based anti-
corruption utility set up and spearheaded by 
the Angolan award-winning journalist and hu-
man rights defender Rafael Marques. It “col-
lects and investigates complaints by Angolan 
citizens regarding acts of corruption.”33More 
recently, one of its investigations - later taken 
on by the Financial Times - led to the US inves-
tigation into corruption allegations surround-
ing Cobalt International Energy’s oil dealings in 
Angola and a case lodged before Angola’s Su-
preme Court.34 As for the disenchanted youth, 
it has used, amid violent government crack-
down, street protests, music - rap in particular 
- and the internet to speak about issues that 
matter to ordinary Angolans: from high levels 
of youth unemployment, corruption and mis-
management, government demolitions of set-
33 http://makaangola.org/?lang=en
34 See R. Marques, “The Angolan Presidency: The Epi-
centre of Corruption”, August 8, 2010, http://makaangola.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/PresidencyCorruption.
pdf; Tom Burgis and Cynthia O’Murchu, “Spotlight Falls 
on Cobalt’s Angola Partner,” April 15, 2012, http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/1225e3de-854d-11e1-a394-00144feab49a.
html#axzz2JDcbB073; Rafael Marques, “Manuel Vicente and 
Kopelipa in Trouble with Justice,” January 6, 2012, http://
makaangola.org/2012/01/06/manuel-vicente-e-kopelipa-a-
contas-com-a-justica/?lang=en
Enabling citizens to use its global 
platform in order to speak for 
themselves on issues that matter 
to them through the medium they 
feel most comfortable with
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tlements without compensation, to elections 
fraud.35 Websites like Eleições Angola (Angola 
Elections)36 and Central 731137 were created 
to serve these purposes.  A great deal still re-
mains to be done in building transparency and 
accountability in Angola. However, there is no 
doubt that by gradually gaining legitimacy,38 
this citizens’ movement is putting pressure on 
the ruling elite and re-shaping the nature of 
citizens’ engagement in the management of 
state affairs.
EITI: Taking Clues from  
the Current Citizens-Led  
Anti-Corruption Movement? 
The paper sought to examine EITI’s track record 
in sub-Saharan Africa. It showed how through 
the MSI, African civil society has had a say in 
the management of the natural resources of 
their countries. It also explained that the EITI 
platform is seen in certain corners, as the trig-
ger for advances in transparency in affiliated 
and non-affiliated states. Lastly, although it is 
difficult to establish a clear causal chain be-
tween these transparency improvements and 
accountability, the paper has sought to convey 
the belief of various civil society actors inter-
viewed, that citizens have used the opening 
of the public sphere, pushed through in part 
by discussions of EITI implementation in their 
countries, to impact other public policy deci-
sions. 
35 See L. Ahrens, “Angola’s Critical Rappers Remain De-
fiantly Vocal as Elections Draw Near,” July 31, 2012, http://
www.thisisafrica.me/music/detail/19545/Angola%E2%80%99s-
critical-rappers-remain-defiantly-vocal-as-elections-draw-near.
“MCK,” “Ikonoklasta” and “Carbono” are some of Angola’s 
most famous protest rappers.
36 http://eleicoesangola2012.com/
37 http://centralangola7311.net/about/
38 In a film about the youth movement, one protest 
rapper is seen talking about the movement gaining legiti-
macy, referring to the fact that less than two years after 
the first demonstration was called in March 2011, they 
had received financial and other support from anony-
mous supporters from within the political circle. Author’s 
interview with D, January 17, 2013. The film, Angola: Birth 
of a Movement, is available from http://www.aljazeera.com/
programmes/activate/2012/10/20121014131143923717.html
Yet, one of the key issues that remain to be 
solved is that of citizens’ engagement in the 
MSI. This is the case not least because after 
an initial period during which its participation 
was allowed, civil society is now trapped in a 
conflict between its own interests, and those 
of powerful vested interests which managed 
to a certain extent, to appropriate the stan-
dard and tame its effectiveness. The corollary 
is that rather than empowering the watchdogs, 
EITI has mostly empowered those who are sup-
posed to be watched. There is a danger that the 
aforementioned dynamic might render the MSI 
ineffective and reverse the gains made during 
its early years. To prevent this from happening, 
the main question is not so much how EITI can 
give its figures a “human face”39 but rather, how 
it can give itself a human face. Responding to 
the former, Katende proposes the creation of 
another mechanism that would compensate 
for the fact that the validation process is not 
effective in this regard.40 This mechanism, he 
adds, should enable the evaluation of the im-
pact of EITI on living conditions; and at the na-
tional level, the assessment of whether money 
derived from the EI sector is invested in priority 
social sectors. 41 
The argument here is that the EITI could 
be improved in order to deliver on its original 
promise of bringing about transformational 
social change - in other words, that the start-
ing point should be to revisit EITI, not replace 
it -; but that in order to achieve this, it needs 
to learn from the current wave of popular up-
risings. In Africa, in addition to context-specific 
elements, this movement is influenced by the 
rise of mobile phones usage, of the middle 
class that plays an important role in helping to 
drive cultural progress, and by demography.42 
It is young people who are leading anti-gov-
ernment and anti-corruption protests across 
39 Quoted in J.C. Katende, above n13.
40 J.C. Katende, above n13.
41 J.C. Katende, above n13.
42 L. Rakotomalala and B. Parrella, “Introduction,” in 
African Voices of Hope and Change, 2012 Citizen Media 
Coverage from the Global Voices Community, Global 
Voices Books, December 2012, http://books.globalvoiceson-
line.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/AfricanVoices_En.pdf
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Africa. And their voices are definitely not to be 
undermined, for they constitute more than 20 
percent of the overall African population43. In 
Angola alone, more than half of the country’s 
population is under the age of 20, and accord-
ing to Ana de Sousa, this “burgeoning youth 
have neither the fear of their parents, nor their 
allegiance to the party that brought indepen-
dence to Angola.”44
The key for EITI in the coming years will be 
how to build on this phenomenon: how can 
it move from promoting its brand and what it 
represents for states and companies, to creat-
ing a bridge between itself and this segment 
of the population that will shape Africa’s fu-
ture; or better still, to enabling citizens to use 
its global platform in order to speak for them-
selves on issues that matter to them through 
the medium they feel most comfortable with. 
Its sustainability depends on it. 
EITI is evolving, as the revision of the 2011 
rules show. The recent public video competi-
tion45 launched by the International Secretariat 
further indicates that it has taken notice of re-
cent trends. The hope is that rather than being 
a stand-alone project, it becomes the launch 
pad for more initiatives aimed specifically at 
empowering ordinary citizens. Only this way 
can EITI become a truly global “multi-stake-
holder” initiative.   
43 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and 
the United Nations Programme on Youth, “Regional Over-
view: Youth in Africa,” 2011, http://social.un.org/youthyear/
docs/Regional%20Overview%20Youth%20in%20Africa.pdf
44 A. de Sousa, “Birth of a Movement: Filmmaker’s 
View,” November 6, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/pro-
grammes/activate/2012/10/20121014131143923717.html
45 See http://eiti.org/public-video-competition
References
 • A. Gupta, “Transparency to The Rescue? 
Assessing the Effectiveness of Governance by 
Disclosure,” Global Governance Working Paper 
No. 38, September 2009, p.7, http://www.
glogov.org/images/doc/wp38.pdf 
 • African Economic Outlook 2012, http://
www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/
human_development/ 
 • African Economic Outlook, “Nigeria,” 2012, 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/
fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Nigeria%20Full%20
PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf 
 • A. Vines, “Angola Changing with the Times,” 
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin, April 2010. 
 • A. Gillies and A. Heuty, “Does Transparency 
Work? The Challenges of Measurement and 
Effectiveness in Resource-Rich Countries,” 
Yale Journal of International Affairs, Spring/
Summer 2011, http://yalejournal.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/09/4.Articles_
GilliesHeuty.pdf 
 • All Party Parliamentary Group on Angola, 
Observations and Recommendations on a 
Visit to Angola, September 2006, http://www.
chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/
Research/Africa/appgangola0906.pdf 
 • A. de Sousa, “Birth of a Movement: 
Filmmaker’s View,” November 6, 2012,  
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/
activate/2012/10/20121014131143923717.html 
 • Angola: Birth of a Movement, is available 
from http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/
activate/2012/10/20121014131143923717.html 
 • A. Peters, T. Forster and L. Koechlin, 
“Towards Non-State Actors as Effective, 
Legitimate, and Accountable Standard Setters” 
in Anne Peters, Till Forster, Lucy Koechlin and 
Fenner Zinkernagel (eds.) Non-State Actors 
as Standards Setters, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.  
89
 • C. House, “Africa Africa’s Economic Growth: 
Transitory or Transformative?” April 20 2012, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/
files/public/Research/Africa/200412summary.pdf 
 • D. O’Sullivan, “EITI Needs to Become More 
Ambitious and More Realistic,” 27 September 
2012, http://eiti.org/blog/eiti-needs-become-
more-ambitious-and-more-realistic 
 • D. Halleson, Amplifying Citizens’ Voices: 
The Role of Civil Society in Promoting 
Accountability and Transparency in 
Cameroon’s Contract Regime’, in A New 
Role for Citizens in Public Procurement, a 
Transparencia Mexicana Initiative, 2012.  
 • EITI Rules, 2011 Edition, EITI International 
Secretariat, Oslo: Norway, http://eiti.org/files/
EITI_Rules_Validations_April2011_1.pdf 
 • EITI, EITI Article of Association, http://eiti.
org/articles 
 • J. Bamendjo, “Triggering the Local Media in 
Covering Oil and Mining Issues in Cameroon,” 
RELUFA Newsletter, Fourteenth Edition, 
September 2010, http://www.relufa.org/
partners/jhnewsletter/archives/cameroon14.htm 
 • J.C. Canonge, Matthew Purcell and Michael 
Behrman, “Watchdog or Lapdog: Limits of 
African Media Coverage of the Extractive 
Sector,” School of International and Public 
Affairs, Columbia University, 2010, http://
ke.kcsis.org/watchdog-or-lapdog-limits-of-
african-media-coverage-of-the-extractive-
sector-report/  
 • J.C. Katende, “The New Challenge for EITI: 
Becoming a Tool for Improving the Living 
Conditions of Poor Populations,” Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, 25 January 
2013, http://eiti.org/blog/new-challenge-eiti-
becoming-tool-improving-living-conditions-
poor-populations
 • K. Lay, “Making Transparency Work for 
Development,” 9 January 2013, http://eiti.org/
blog/making-transparency-work-development-
nigeria 
 • L. Rakotomalala & B. Parrella, 
“Introduction,” in African Voices of Hope 
and Change, 2012 Citizen Media Coverage 
from the Global Voices Community, Global 
Voices Books, December 2012, http://
books.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/12/AfricanVoices_En.pdf  
 • L. Ahrens, “Angola’s Critical Rappers 
Remain Defiantly Vocal as Elections Draw 
Near,” July 31, 2012, http://www.thisisafrica.
me/music/detail/19545/Angola%E2%80%99s-
critical-rappers-remain-defiantly-vocal-as-
elections-draw-near 
 • Misereor, Global Policy Forum Europe and 
Brot für die Welt, “Transparency: An Initial 
Step Towards Justice” An Interim Balance 
of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) in the Central African Region, 
2011, http://www.cidse.org/content/
publications/business-a-human-rights/country-
by-country-reporting/transparency_initial_
step_towards_resource_justice.html  
 • M. Abutudu and G. Dauda, “Natural 
Resource Governance and EITI Implementation 
in Nigeria,” Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 
Sweden, 2011.  
 • R. Marques, “Manuel Vicente and 
Kopelipa in Trouble with Justice,” January 
6, 2012, http://makaangola.org/2012/01/06/
manuel-vicente-e-kopelipa-a-contas-com-a-
justica/?lang=en 
 • R. Marques, “The Angolan Presidency: 
The Epicentre of Corruption,” August 8, 
2010, http://makaangola.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/01/PresidencyCorruption.pdf  
 • R. Auty, “Sustaining Development in 
Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse 
Building Transparency and Accountability in the Oil Industry in Africa
What Next for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)?
90
Transparencia Mexicana´s Series on
Thesis,” London: Routledge, 1993. 
 • S. Bracking, “Hiding Conflict Over Industry 
Returns: A Stakeholder Analysis of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,” 
BWPI Working Paper 91, 2009. 
 • Scanteam, “Achievements and Strategic 
Options: Evaluation of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative,” Final 
Report, May 2011, http://eiti.org/files/2011-
EITI-evaluation-report.pdf 
 • S. Ariel Aaronson and J. Brinkerhoff, 
“Limited Partnership: Business, Government, 
Civil Society (NGOs) and the Public in the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI),” George Washington University, October 
2009, http://elliott.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/
papers/Aaronson_IIEPWP2010-28.pdf 
 • T.L. Karl, “The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms 
and Petro-States,” University of California 
Press, 1997. 
 • The IDL Group and Synergy, “Validation of 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
in Ghana,” Final Report, http://eiti.org/files/
Ghana_Validation_Reports_ENG_0.pdf 
 • T. Burgis and C. O’Murchu, “Spotlight Falls 
on Cobalt’s Angola Partner,” April 15, 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1225e3de-854d-
11e1-a394-00144feab49a.html#axzz2JDcbB073 
 • United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa and the United Nations Programme on 
Youth, “Regional Overview: Youth in Africa,” 
2011, http://social.un.org/youthyear/docs/
Regional%20Overview%20Youth%20in%20
Africa.pdf 
Websites
 • http://eiti.org/public-video-competition 
 • http://eleicoesangola2012.com/ 
 • http://centralangola7311.net/about/  
 • http://makaangola.org/?lang=en 
 •  http://eiti.org/document/2011-secretariat 
report 
 • http://eiti.org/eiti/implementation/signup 
 
Interviews and Communications
 •  Interview with former EITI Board member, 
April 26, 2010 
 •  Interview with Angolan NGO official, 
August 4, 2010.  
 •  Interview with NGO Official,  
August 18, 2010.  
 •  Communication with a Congolese Activist, 
August 31, 2012.  
 •  Interview with Journalist D.,  
January 17, 2013.  
 
Other
 •  Lettre au President (Letter to the President), 
a song by the Cameroonian Rapper 
nicknamed “Valsero”.
